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Abstract An approach to analyze high‐end sea level rise is presented to provide a conceptual framework
for high‐end estimates as a function of time scale, thereby linking robust sea level science with stakeholder
needs. Instead of developing and agreeing on a set of high‐end sea level rise numbers or using an expert
consultation, our effort is focused on the essential task of providing a generic conceptual framework for such
discussions and demonstrating its feasibility to address this problem. In contrast, information about
high‐end sea level rise projections was derived previously either from a likely range emerging from the
highest view of emissions in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessment (currently the
Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5 scenario) or from independent ad hoc studies and expert
solicitations. Ideally, users need high‐end sea level information representing the upper tail of a single joint
sea level frequency distribution, which considers all plausible yet unknown emission scenarios as well as
involved physical mechanisms and natural variability of sea level, but this is not possible. In the absence of
such information we propose a framework that would infer the required information from explicit
conditional statements (lines of evidence) in combination with upper (plausible) physical bounds. This
approach acknowledges the growing uncertainty in respective estimates with increasing time scale. It also
allows consideration of the various levels of risk aversion of the diverse stakeholders who make coastal
policy and adaptation decisions, while maintaining scientiﬁc rigor.
1. Introduction
Observed and expected sea level rise is a prominent result of climate change with profound consequences for
coastal societies, especially those on low‐lying lands and islands (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 2018). A dominant cause of future long‐term sea level rise is anthropogenic CO2 emissions
(Church et al., 2013), and the response of individual climate system components to the associated tempera-
ture increase, notably the thermal expansion of ocean water and mass loss from glaciers, and ice sheets,
which add mass and volume to the ocean. Based on the output from climate models, sea level rise scenarios
have been produced with increasing sophistication since the 1980s. Recently, the ﬁfth Assessment Report
(AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provided a likely range of future sea level
rise under various climate change scenarios (Church et al., 2013; Slangen et al., 2014), thereby accounting for
expert judgment on the interpretation of the range of simulated model outputs. An overview of sea level pro-
jection available during for 21st century is presented by Garner et al. (2018).
For a low‐forcing scenario (Representative Concentration Pathway 2.6, RCP2.6), AR5 assessed that sea level
rise by 2100 relative to the period 1986–2005 will likely be in the range of 0.28 to 0.61 m. For a high emission
RCP8.5 type forcing, the rise will likely be in the range 0.52 to 0.98 m. Within the IPCC nomenclature likely
refers to a probability exceeding 66% (Mastrandrea et al., 2010); at the same time the likely range is also used
for the interval 17–83% of a not necessarily symmetric probability density function (pdf). Therefore the likely
range does not explicitly consider the tails of the distribution or describes any asymmetry in these tails,
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information that is essential for risk adverse stakeholders interested in the high‐end tails of the distribution.
Hence, information about the likely range of global mean sea level is insufﬁcient to plan the full range of
coastal adaptation responses (Hinkel et al., 2019).
The only guidance that the AR5 gave for high‐end scenarios at the end of the 21st century was that there was
medium conﬁdence that any additional contribution, beyond the likely range, would not exceed several
tenths of a meter during the 21st century, leaving room for user interpretation. This was based on the under-
standing that only the collapse of marine‐based sectors of the Antarctic ice sheet, if initiated, could cause glo-
bal mean sea level to rise substantially above the likely range during the 21st century. In this context marine
ice sheet instability was considered to be the key process; however, there was insufﬁcient knowledge to be
more speciﬁc and to explicitly and reliably estimate possible magnitudes, because data records were scarce
and too short and the physical understanding of grounding line retreat was incomplete.
At the time of writing the AR5, it was concluded that there was insufﬁcient evidence in the published litera-
ture to describe the shape of the tail of the probability distribution. This reﬂects the high uncertainty in all
sea level components and future emissions and thus the magnitude of sea level rise through the 21st century,
both globally and regionally. The lack of detailed knowledge about future emissions and our limited under-
standing of physical processes controlling Antarctic ice sheet dynamics are the biggest uncertainties, parti-
cular for long‐term projections of sea level rise. Hence, estimates of high‐end sea level rise become
increasingly uncertain further into the future.
Despite the difﬁculties to specify high‐end sea level rise from a physical modeling perspective, stakeholders
have a strong desire for information about the high‐end sea level rise tails of the distribution outside the spe-
ciﬁed likely IPCC range (Hinkel et al., 2015; Hinkel et al., 2019; Le Cozannet, Manceau, et al., 2017). In addi-
tion, many stakeholders and decision makers have a strong need for regional to local relative sea level (RSL)
information, including vertical land movement. This information allows analysis of the consequences across
the range of sea level rise and responses, including issues of timing (Haasnoot, Warren, et al., 2019). Along
most coastlines, local sea level changes can differ signiﬁcantly by up to 20% or more from the global mean
change, and together with long‐period tidal effects, this can greatly increase the frequency of a given extreme
water level event by a factor of 100 or more with 50 cm of sea level rise (Church et al., 2013).
Where sufﬁcient data is available, best estimates of likely ranges of regional to local sea level information can
be provided (Carson et al., 2016). However, in most instances, information on more severe—high‐end—sea
level scenarios is important to planners as it frames the greatest risk, largest damages, and highest prospec-
tive costs in planning adaptation. Hence, there is a signiﬁcant demand for a curated “worst‐case” scenario of
sea level rise for planning purposes and investment decisions, even if such a requirement is difﬁcult to deﬁne
from a rigorous scientiﬁc perspective in terms of amplitudes and probabilities.
Since the AR5 was published new information emerged from evolving science about high‐end sea level rise.
However, at the same time new questions arose about whether and how decision makers and engineers
might incorporate new, but controversial, science results into their adaptation planning which generally rely
on actionable science representing a broad consensus and not simply the latest science (Vogel et al., 2016).
Anthropogenic subsidence constitutes another source to RSL with major potential impacts. For sedimentary
lowlands such as deltas, this can sometimes be larger than the climate driven RSL rise (Tessler et al., 2018),
and in some coastal cities practicing groundwater withdrawal such as Jakarta, local subsidence rates can be
more than 10 times current climate‐induced RSL (Nicholls, 2018).
Transparency is critical in communicating information about high‐end estimates to a wider audience, sug-
gesting the need for a framework providing a rationale for linking high‐end estimates of sea level rise to var-
ious types of stakeholder decisions and applications. However, a solid conceptual framework that links sea
level science with stakeholder needs and which is an essential step to provide guidance for stakeholders is
lacking. As the meaning of high‐end scenarios depend on the risk aversion of stakeholders, an ongoing dia-
log between stakeholders and the scientiﬁc community is critical to deﬁne the needs and develop together
appropriate solutions that are scientiﬁcally rigorous: that is, coproduction is critical (Hall et al., 2019;
Vogel et al., 2016).
Building on multiple existing and sometimes controversial concepts of high‐end sea level changes, deﬁni-
tions and terminology, including probabilistic approaches and upper bound concepts (Table 1), the goal of
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this paper is to develop a framework and a common language for future high‐end estimates of sea level rise
that is useful for stakeholder application. Instead of developing and agreeing on a set of high‐end sea level
rise numbers, or using an expert consultation, our effort is focused on providing a generic conceptual
Table 1
Approaches to Select high‐End Sea Level Scenarios as a Function of the Level of Uncertainty Considered Following the Approach of Walker et al. (2013)
Level of uncertainty considered
(after Walker et al., 2003)
Examples in the area
of sea level rise
Related approaches to select high‐end
sea level scenario (see section 3)
Comment on existing high‐end
scenarios (see section 3)
Determinism (assuming no
uncertainties)
Single ﬁxed sea level allowance, for
use in design guidance and codes
(e.g., French regulatory 60‐cm sea
level rise scenario for 2100
(Ministère de L'Ecologie, du
Développement Durable, des
Transports et du Logement, 2011)
and port design guidance
(Thoresen, 2014)
Not applicable: this approach neglects uncertainties in sea level
projections and therefore does not consider high‐end change
Statistical uncertainties
(can be adequately
described in statistical terms)
Probabilistic sea level predictions,
independent from external
assumptions such as Representative
Concentration Pathway (RCP)
scenarios (see Figure 2). (note that
there are no known example of
such predictions in the current
published literature,
Hinkel et al., 2019)
High‐end scenarios based on the
selection of thresholds in the upper
tail of probabilistic sea level
prediction (e.g., 0.1%, 1%, 5%; e.g.,
see method in Jevrejeva et al., 2014)
The upper tail of the distributions are
currently considered too poorly
constrained to deﬁne precise high‐end
scenarios (Horton et al., 2018; Le
Cozannet, Manceau, & Rohmer, 2017).
Existing probabilistic projections do not
yet combine all RCP scenarios
(see Figure 2)
Scenario uncertainties
(depend on fundamental
uncertainties external to
the system considered,
such as human policies and
environmental changes)
Alternative futures described by
probabilistic projection and
conditioned to RCP scenarios (e.g.,
Kopp et al., 2014; Jackson &
Jevrejeva, 2016; De Winter et al.,
2017; Kopp et al., 2014;
Garner et al., 2018)
High‐end scenarios provided in a
probabilistic form, and assuming
high greenhouse gas emissions and
ice contributions (Jackson &
Jevrejeva, 2016; Le Bars et al., 2017)
See above: probabilistic projections
provide some basis to estimate the most
likely scenarios, but there is limited
conﬁdence in higher quantiles
(Horton et al., 2018; Le
Cozannet, Nicholls, et al., 2017).
High‐end scenarios based on the
selection of thresholds in the upper
tail of a probability distribution
conditioned to RCP8.5
(e.g., Jevrejeva et al., 2014)
It is unsure that RCP8.5 is the most
appropriate assumption for deﬁning
high‐end scenarios applicable for coastal
adaptation (e.g., Hinkel et al., 2019).
Sea level change scenarios exploring a
limited number of greenhouse gas
emissions and land ice
contributions
High‐end scenarios provided as single
values or intervals, based on the sum
of the various sea level contributions
(Katsman et al., 2011; National
Research Council, 1987).
Need for research in the area of ice sheet
melting modeling to better evaluate the
plausibility of different ice sheet melting
mechanisms at various time horizons
(see section 3)
Recognized ignorance
(known unknowns)
Sea level scenarios considering
quantiﬁcations of lower and upper
limits for future sea level changes.
Scenarios beyond the likely range, but
remaining within physical
constraints (e.g., limits to land ice
melting kinematics, Pfeffer et al.,
2008, and/or assuming sustained or
acceleration of ground subsidence,
Wang et al., 1995).
Need for research in the area of ice sheet
melting modeling to better evaluate the
maximum contributions of ice‐sheets
mechanisms at various time horizons
(see section 3)
Extraprobabilistic sea level projections
(e.g., likely range of Church et al.,
2013) based on several different
system models
Scenarios considering diverse lines of
evidences, eventually exceeding
current estimates of physical
constraints (e.g., H++ scenarios,
Wilby et al., 2011; Ranger et al., 2013;
Nicholls et al., 2014)
Total ignorance
(unknown unknowns)
Sea level scenarios not considered possible today, but which could be considered possible in the future if new physical
processes are discovered (e.g., 5‐ to 6‐m sea level rise scenarios by 2100 considered in Keller et al. (2008) in an
adaptation “thought” experiment)
Lack strong basis to explore this level of uncertainty in a systematic way (Walker et al., 2003)
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framework for such discussions and demonstrating its feasibility to address this problem. We also consider
the implications of high‐end estimates on a variety of time scales, from a few decades to the end of the cen-
tury and beyond. We hope that results framed in such a way will constructively contribute to the debate on
high‐end sea level rise by leading to less ambiguous and more robust messages for the science and stake-
holder communities alike.
2. User Needs for High‐End Sea Level Information?
A range of user needs for sea level rise information can be deﬁned, including high‐end scenarios for robust
decision‐making (Hinkel et al., 2019). For example, long‐term planning of ﬂood defenses for London and the
Netherlands triggered early work on this question (Katsman et al., 2011; Lowe et al., 2009), while more
recently, the implications of uncertainty in high‐end scenarios of sea level rise for adaptation in the Port
of Los Angeles were considered by Sriver et al. (2018). More generally, there are other possible high‐end
needs such as: (1) urban planners considering zoning, urban capital improvement plans, and their tax base;
(2) city engineers considering the performance and reliability of water supply, wastewater, and storm water
management systems, shoreline erosion protection, and ﬂood risk reduction measures; (3) the private sector
considering the viability of facilities and supply chains in the near, midterm, and far future in order to plan
capital investments; and (4) changing ecosystems and ecosystem goods and services. All of these users are
interested in diverse ranges of impacts and varying adaptation measures and as a result will have diverse
requirements in terms of sea level rise information.
The constituency of those concerned with coastal adaptation has broadened with time as societal awareness
of the threat grew. Today, there is a large set of potential adaptation users with diverse needs (Hinkel et al.,
2019; Le Cozannet, Nicholls, et al., 2017). Some adaptation planners consider time scales far into the future
due to asset life cycles of 100 years or more (e.g., water and wastewater systems) and for high impact events
(e.g., London's and the Netherlands' ﬂood defenses or for coastal nuclear power stations where safety is para-
mount; Wilby et al., 2011; Ranger et al., 2013).
Beyond impacting individual infrastructure lifetimes, these decisions have important implications far
beyond the current century in terms of patterns of land use and settlement. However, there are many other
adaptation decisions that are shorter term andmore easily adjusted over time, such as immediate sand nour-
ishment requirements (Hanson et al., 2002), which are updated on a 10‐/20‐year cycle and hence might use
sea level and erosion observations rather than projections.
The longer the time span, the greater the need for an understanding of the range of possible sea level rise,
and its implications for impacts and adaptation decision making. The emissions scenario is another key vari-
able, and to date, higher emission scenarios have generally been considered, taking a precautionary route,
especially for longer‐term decisions. While these are designed using integrated assessment models and pro-
jections of future population and GDP up to 2100, beyond 2100 emissions scenarios are typically idealized,
for instance continuing 2100 emission levels further into the future or reducing emission levels over an arbi-
trary time frame (O'Neill et al., 2016).
Further requirements for high‐end sea level rise information comes from those concerned with mitigation.
Decisions addressing the ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Article 2), require glo-
bal scale information as well as local or regional scale information, as in adaptation. For mitigation, contrast-
ing different emission pathways is at the core of the analysis. However, for all scenarios, even if we meet the
objective of the Paris Agreement to stabilize emissions to meet a climate warming level that is “well below
2 °C above preindustrial levels” (Article 2), there is need for knowledge of the upper end sea level rise under
these conditions as impacts, while reduced, are still expected to require adaptation under all current scenar-
ios. Further sea level rise is expected to continue beyond 2100 for centuries threatening growing impacts and
adaptation needs (Nicholls & Lowe, 2004).
While the literature is beginning to systematically report about the sea level information needs of some users
and the challenges in satisfying them (Hinkel et al., 2019; Le Cozannet, Nicholls, et al., 2017), this should not
be considered a full catalog. Instead, many needs arise in the practitioner community, often on a local scale,
and may not be reported or assessed in the scientiﬁc literature. Thus, our assessment of needs in this paper
10.1029/2019EF001163Earth's Future
STAMMER ET AL. 4
considers both the literature and the wider practical experience of the author team, who has worked on a
wide variety of coastal adaptation projects at all scales. Increasingly adaptation planners are also asked to
go beyond local considerations or standard cost‐beneﬁt analysis and also consider regional to national
preferences or other approaches to investment decisions, including recognition of deep uncertainty (e.g.,
Aerts et al., 2014; Haasnoot, Warren, & Kwakkel, 2019; Hallegatte et al., 2012). Furthermore, information
is also needed at the global scale from the mitigation standpoint to understand potential beneﬁts of
emission reduction policies in the context of reduced sea level rise and associated impacts and
adaptation needs.
Thus, we recognize that the users of sea level rise projection information include a wide range of global
to local stakeholders concerned with social, economic, environmental, and risk prevention policies
applicable in coastal areas. Among these users, those requiring high‐end scenarios are primarily those
recognizing that their management decisions may lead to maladaptation traps (Magnan et al., 2016)
above a certain amount of sea level rise or sea level rise rates. For example there is a need to move
beyond present approaches, such as those used in a disaster risk management approach, which typically
assume stationary hazard statistics, toward methods that take account of a changing climate. This
includes the iterative approach to risk management promoted by the IPCC (Jones et al., 2014) that
acknowledges the climate is changing and we need to consider not just changing hazard but also chan-
ging exposure and vulnerability through a risk management lens (Figure 1). Without adaptation, sea
level rise increases ﬂood frequency and reduces time for recovery, challenging to local capacities to main-
tain acceptable safety standards and appropriate expectations of economic damages. Here, high‐end sce-
narios can be useful to estimate if and when the resilience capacity of each community could be
exceeded and what choices this raises in terms of adaptation (advance, protect, accommodate, and
retreat; Nicholls, 2018; Haasnoot, Brown, et al., 2019).
The most obvious needs for high‐end scenarios emerge from stakeholders with high‐risk aversion (Hinkel
et al., 2015, 2019; Nicholls et al., 2014), that is, from managers of critical infrastructures such as ports, che-
mical industries, or nuclear plants (Wilby et al., 2011) or highly exposed and/or vulnerable settlements such
as urbanized estuaries and coasts or low‐lying atolls (Nurse et al., 2014; Ranger et al., 2013). The number of
potential users of high‐end scenarios is probably much larger than previously thought for the following
reasons:
Figure 1. Schematic of an iterative coastal adaptation approach (adapted from Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 2018; Jones et al., 2014), which is an iterative process, which updates adaptation measures and strategies over
time (see ﬁfth Assessment Report WG2 Ch2, https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5‐Chap2_FINAL.
pdf)
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1. Adaptation decisions are not independent and raise questions about the needs, adaptive capacity, and
degree of risk aversion of neighbors (cf. Nicholls et al., 2013).
2. There is a lack of empirical literature that has elicited and documented risk preferences of coastal users in
different social, economic, cultural and ethical contexts (Hinkel et al., 2019), as has been done in some
other ﬁelds, such as occupational health and safety (e.g., Tchiehe & Gauthier, 2017),
3. Many users do not initially formulate their requirements in a precise way: their need for high‐end scenar-
ios only becomes apparent in the process of adaptation as they question storylines involving sea level
changes above the likely range and those which exceed their adaptive capacity.
As a consequence, there are many potential users of high‐end sea level rise scenarios with a diverse set of
needs and concerns. Further empirical research is needed to map them and, ultimately, involve them in
the design of appropriate sea level high‐end products. Ongoing developments on climate services for adapta-
tion may support this process (Brasseur & Gallardo, 2016; Hewitt et al., 2012; Le Cozannet, Nicholls, et al.,
2017; Vogel et al., 2016).
3. Why Is Consensus on High‐End Scenarios Difﬁcult to Achieve?
Despite the need for high‐end scenarios and various attempts at producing these, there is no consensus in the
current sea level literature on high‐end sea level rise scenarios and the methods to be applied to produce
them. To understand why there is a lack of consensus, we must ﬁrst recognize that there are several sources
of information about potential high‐end scenarios, together with different approaches to aggregating, inte-
grating, and translating this information into actionable science.
As one possible source of information on high‐end sea level rise, we can use evidence from past interglacial
periods in the geologic record that experienced warmer polar temperatures and higher global mean sea level
than present today (Dutton et al., 2015). Speciﬁcally, the Mid‐PlioceneWarm Period (MPWP; ~3.2 to 3.0 mil-
lion years ago) and the marine isotope stage 5e (MIS 5e; 129,000–116,000 years ago; the Eemian) both offer
useful analogs to the future: sea level was much higher during these warmer periods than today, whereas
global mean temperatures where not very different from present‐day.
Although the MPWP had radiation conditions more comparable to present‐day than MIS 5e conditions,
reconstructions from sea level proxies remain highly challenging (Raymo et al., 2011). In contrast, the
MIS 5e peak sea level appears better constrained in the range of 6–9 m above present levels (Kopp et al.,
2009). However, the accuracy of the associated polar and local temperature change during that period
remains problematic (Dahl‐Jensen et al., 2013; Landais et al., 2016; Otto‐Bliesner et al., 2013). Also, the asso-
ciated uncertainty in the mass balance formulation (Helsen et al., 2013) and the role of basal melting in
Antarctica possibly implies that ice sheets are more vulnerable for modest changes, though the physics
are poorly understood. It is therefore unclear whether results are applicable for present‐day and near future
conditions (Horton et al., 2019). So despite the importance of continued studies on past sea level variations,
we can conclude that at present these data alone do not provide enough constraints on high‐end centennial
sea level rise for CO2‐driven changes in future.
Another aspect of the problem of estimating high‐end sea level projections arises from our limited physical
understanding. Several physical processes have been suggested to play a role in the rapid decay of ice sheets
in a warmer climate. If the ice is in contact with the ocean, basal melt rates are controlled by water tempera-
ture, salinity, and ﬂow. Measurements of basal melt rates are logistically challenging and only limited data
exists, so even the geometrical conditions of the cavities around the ice sheet are poorly known.
Nevertheless, observations suggest that retreat rates are highest in areas where the ice is in contact with
the ocean (Joughin et al., 2014; Rignot et al., 2014).
Whether these enhanced melt rates are driven by variability in the ocean temperature or long‐term trends
cannot yet be deciphered given the limited data and length of the observational record with respect to the
time scales of ocean variability and ice sheet response (Jenkins et al., 2018). Moreover, it is unclear how
the ice dynamics respond to a changing basal melt rate. If the ice is resting on a reversed bedrock, enhanced
basal melt rates may trigger an instability mechanism, known as the “marine ice sheet instability” (MISI;
Weertman, 1974).
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Since the ice ﬂow in these regions depends on the ice thickness (Schoof, 2007), a retreating ice sheet will
increase the ice ﬂux to the ocean via a positive feedback. The rate of retreat and the possibility of halting
the process depends on local conditions. Pinning points and shear stress along the margins
(Gudmundsson et al., 2012) may counterbalance the increased mass ﬂux and stabilize the ice sheet. At the
same time, recent observations in West Antarctica suggest that MISI retreat is already occurring in major
outlet systems like Pine Island and Thwaites glacier (e.g., Mouginot et al., 2014). A complete retreat of these
basins could result in several meters of sea level rise due to their large ice volumes. Hence, they are critical
for assessing high‐end sea level projections.
The rate of retreat of the grounding line and the details of modelingMISI are still debated (Pattyn et al., 2012;
Pattyn, 2018). This leads to a wide range of estimates of the ice sheet contribution to sea level, where a mod-
est grounding line retreat formulation yields 0.1 m in 2100 under RCP8.5 (i.e., low sea level rise (SLR) con-
tribution), whereas a more aggressive formulation withmelt beyond the grounding line yields 0.39 m in 2100
(Golledge et al., 2015; i.e., high SLR contribution). Levermann et al. (2013) estimates for the same scenario
0.09 m based on a linear response theory including a time delay between oceanic subsurface temperatures
and atmosphere temperatures and 0.15 m assuming no time delay. Alternative guidance can be derived from
the current observations in those basins as explored by an ice dynamical study by Ritz et al. (2015) for the
A1B scenario.
Beside basal melt rates, ice shelves can be destabilized by a combination of increased surface melt initiated
by warmer surface temperatures in combination with hydrofracturing whereby the water penetrates into the
shelves and leads to a rapid disintegration. Examples of this combined processes have been observed at
Larsen A, B, and C which disintegrated in the late 20th/early 21st century (e.g., Rack & Rott, 2004; Rott
et al., 1996). Once the shelves are removed, MISI can occur in some regions, leading to rapid retreat and
ice loss. Whether and when hydrofracturing becomes important is strongly dependent on the surface condi-
tions. Trusel et al. (2015) suggested that for the majority of ice shelves, melt rates are too small to generate
enough surface melt before the end of the century under RCP4.5 conditions but that for RCP8.5 conditions
a few ice shelves approach or exceed the necessary threshold. However, over longer time scales and higher
temperatures, large‐scale hydrofracturing might be initiated. Once ice shelves disappear, ice cliffs may form
at some locations. These cliffs have a narrow range for which they are stable (Bassis & Walker, 2012) and
might lead to a large ice dynamical contribution from Antarctica (DeConto & Pollard, 2016).
Application of DeConto and Pollard (2016), in combination with other processes that contribute to sea level
rise, provides the basis of many recent probabilistic sea level rise estimates with high values for the upper
end of the probability distribution function (e.g., Kopp et al., 2014; Le Bars et al., 2017). The estimates of
DeConto and Pollard (2016), based on unusually high surface melt rates combined with hydrofracturing
and ice cliff instability, lead to a sea level rise, which is considerably higher than all other ice sheet models,
and this is currently heavily disputed (Edwards et al., 2019). Including ice cliff failure in models is currently
problematic as there are hardly any observational constraints, and as a consequence, retreat rates of cliffs are
highly uncertain. Geological data provide limited support (Wise et al., 2017), and retreat rates of ice cliffs in
narrow fjords in Greenland may not be representative for the wide basins in the Antarctic like the
Thwaites glacier.
Nevertheless, the study by DeConto and Pollard pointed to a potential mechanism of signiﬁcant and rapid
retreat of Antarctic ice masses. Its validity is currently debated in the community and statistical emulators
question the need of the use of ice cliff instability to explain the observational constraints (Edwards et al.,
2019). Hence, sea level projections outside the IPCC AR5 likely range derived from a mechanistic process‐
based approach remain impossible before a better understanding is developed of the key processes control-
ling the large uncertainties in ice sheet loss, these being (1) basal melt related to warming and/or changes in
ocean circulation, (2) hydrofracturing related to warming surface conditions on Antarctic ice shelves, and (3)
ice cliff instability. We also note that for time scales longer than a century, uncertainties in our process
understanding increases signiﬁcantly, further complicating the production of high‐end sea level scenarios.
In the absence of this detailed knowledge of the physical processes, quantiﬁed probabilistic approaches are
being produced and are widely inﬂuencing decision‐oriented documents today, including expert elicitation
approaches (e.g., Bamber, & Aspinall, 2013; Bamber, et al., 2019; Horton et al., 2014). This knowledge is
being inﬂuential in coastal management in the United States and elsewhere (Hall et al., 2019; State of
10.1029/2019EF001163Earth's Future
STAMMER ET AL. 7
California Sea‐Level Rise Guidance, 2018). However, over conﬁdence in expert elicitations, can imply
greater precision in our understanding than is merited and require extensive interpretive guidance that
can be missing (Behar et al., 2017). In particular, issues associated with both identiﬁcation of upper end tails
for SLR and probabilistic characterization of those tails are currently playing out widely in the United States
and elsewhere. As an example, projections relying substantially both on Kopp et al. (2014) and DeConto and
Pollard (2016) have multiplied in recent years. Many of these have been provided to local and state govern-
ments to guide vulnerability assessments and adaptation plans within insufﬁcient guidance and dialog about
their meaning and possible interpretation (Hinkel et al., 2015; Zheng, & Behar, 2017).
Below, we propose a more robust framework to analyze these problems and develop useful high‐end sea
level scenarios that embraces user risk aversion and encourages debate and understanding by the users
about uncertainties and level of conﬁdence across all the available information on future sea levels.
4. Framework for High‐End Sea Level Scenarios
To improve how high‐end sea level information is developed and communicated in support of decision‐
making, what is needed is an agreed conceptual framework, encompassing several alternative approaches
of how information about the upper tail can be produced, analyzed, and integrated with observations and
interpreted for the decision‐making context. In this context we need to distinguish between ﬁve distinct
components contributing to the generation of sea level information suitable for decision‐making: (1) future
CO2 emissions and other climatically active forcing, (2) the regional atmospheric and ocean temperature
(and other climate parameters) response to those CO2 emissions, (3) the sea level response to those CO2
emissions and temperature changes, (4) the physics of the ice sheet contribution (in particular
Antarctica), and (5) understanding stakeholders risk averseness to sea level rise for different purposes, ide-
ally using a coproduction approach where user can consider both the impacts and available adaptation
options. These components combine natural and social science inputs to provide appropriate information
for policy and decision analysis.
We illustrate this schematically in Figure 2, which shows several alternative approaches to generating high‐
end sea level rise information based on diverse conceptualizations of high‐end sea level. Table 1 provides
further information on each of the approaches following Walker et al. (2003), who describe a continuum
of projected futures ranging from very well characterized to total ignorance. Until now, these distinct con-
ceptualizations of high‐end sea level have not been signiﬁcantly recognized in the scientiﬁc literature and
in the media (Van der Pol & Hinkel, 2019). However, they differ fundamentally in their meaning and impli-
cations and should not be confused with each other. Results from one certainly cannot be compared quan-
titatively to that from another or combined. Below, we discuss different ways of using this knowledge and
propose a pragmatic approach, which makes the most of the available physical understanding.
A ﬁrst possible approach is given by schematic sea level rise frequency distributions representing Coupled
Model Intercomparison Project phase 5 (CMIP5) RCP scenarios obtained from an ensemble of physics‐based
coupled climate models amended by off‐line information about contributions from the cryosphere and the
solid Earth. These are shown as black bell shaped‐like curves. Typically, these distribution functions are
truncated in their tails due to limited ensemble sizes or, related to the high‐end tail, limited representation
of physical processes involved, such as ice sheet dynamics. Nevertheless, they are being used to provide esti-
mates of likely sea level ranges and the median values for various RCP scenarios.
A second possible approach is given by the blue envelope, which, contrary to the ﬁrst approach combines the
sea level results emerging from all possible, yet unknown emission scenarios (e.g., the CMIP5 RCP scenarios
or a wider range of emission) into one single frequency distribution but also to account for natural variability
of sea level usually estimated by an ensemble of model solutions for each of those forcing functions (e.g., Hu
& Deser, 2013). This approach requires providing probabilities for each of these individual CO2 emission
pathways to occur, a recently emerging ﬁeld (e.g., Budescu et al., 2009; Webster et al., 2002). The utility of
this approach has been debated in the climate change scientiﬁc community and is largely rejected as the blue
curve would be highly sensitive to the likelihoods attached to individual emission scenarios (Lempert &
Schlesinger, 2001; Stirling, 2010). Nevertheless, coastal adaptation decision‐making can proceed, and does
so in practice, without having a single pdf available (Van der Pol & Hinkel, 2019). However, we note that
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the pdf will change shape over time, not just as we learn more about the physical system but also as the
options and preferences for future CO2 emission pathways change.
Circumventing the present difﬁculty of constructing the blue curve, the most commonly used approach
toward providing information on high‐end sea level rise is to provide a conditional statement about sea level
rise under a deﬁned emission scenario. But even with the full probabilistic information for a speciﬁc emis-
sion scenario, model projections still omit the high‐end tail of the projected distribution functions (green ver-
tical line), reﬂecting our limited physical understanding, for example, due to our lack of understanding of ice
sheet dynamics, though the additional bands including the ice dynamics could be made dependent on the
RCP scenario and time scale.
An alternative pragmatic approach, which we advocate, is to develop expert judgment views about the upper
tail. This approach separates the range of possible sea level outcomes exceeding the likely range into a series
of sea level rise intervals a few tens of cm wide (called “bands” hereafter), building on the conﬁdence deﬁni-
tions and lines of evidence adopted in the AR5 and more recent literature. Each band can be assessed for the
lines of evidence that support a possible sea level rise of the band's magnitude together with the respective
conﬁdence in this information. Such lines of evidence include physics‐based models, palaeoclimate evi-
dence, physical constraints, model sensitivity studies, and expert judgment interpretation of existing projec-
tions. Moving to increasingly higher bands, the evidence and agreement among experts for such a rise tends
to decline, leading to a decline the conﬁdence represented by the gray bands.
This approach recognizes that we might not have enough information to actually quantify the probability of
the upper values. Instead we make more use of conﬁdence. The band with the highest sea level rise but low-
est conﬁdence could then serve as an upper bound estimate for speciﬁc practical planning purposes.
However, users who are less risk averse or have adaptive management ﬂexibility that allows adaptation
approaches to be revised over time may choose a lower band, or even stay within the RCP range noting
the conﬁdence in the highest values tends to be lower. This latter approach represents and builds on the
evidence‐based available to users. It helps users consider the evidence versus their risk aversion and hence
where they might draw the high‐end bound for their speciﬁc decision. This recognizes that different users
have different risk tolerance and therefore different needs (Hinkel et al., 2019) and that the user appropriate
high end estimates will differ between users.
Figure 2. Multiple concepts of high‐end sea level. The x axis is the amount of sea level rise for a given time interval. In the
vertical the ﬁgure displays the probability density. The blue curve represents a combined pdf for all possible emission
scenarios. The gray and red building blocks have to be added to the Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) curves
depending on the risk aversion of the users. The hatched vertical bar represents the range in which the high‐end is
being expected to reside for a particular stakeholder. The distinction between gray and red building blocks is lines of
evidence versus physical implausibility.
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Alternatively, one could start from a very high but physically implausible number (right red band, mainly
determined by the loss of all land‐ice on Earth) and work downward toward the smallest possible physically
plausible range by examining tighter constraints, for example, physical limiting arguments on the energy
input of the system and/or on rates of change. While the former evidence‐based approach is expected to
be based on projection information, the latter approach is based on physical constraints on the system—such
as the total amount of ice available or possibly the paleo evidence.
Either way, one ultimately would end with an estimate of a high‐end range illustrated by the hatched gray
area in Figure 2. We also note that only some lines of evidence have likelihood statements. More often, how-
ever, this will not be the case because it is an extrapolation of a distribution trained on lower values. The gray
and red ranges therefore will usually come only with conﬁdence statements.
5. A Practical Path to Consensus on a Framework on High‐End Estimates
Despite all the existing scientiﬁc and practical difﬁculties in deﬁning or estimating the high‐end sea level
rise, stakeholders have a strong need for information on high‐end or upper bound sea level scenarios in sup-
port of coastal planning and adaptation, including the degree of consensus about this information. In the
absence of any solid information, the void will be ﬁlled with extrapolations, assumptions, or guesses, regard-
less of whether this is scientiﬁcally sensible or not. In addition, we have noticed a tendency for the highest of
high‐end projections to receive disproportionate coverage in print, television, and digital media, the most
common source of information for decision makers. This information is often unaccompanied by presenta-
tion of the broader research context, key temporal considerations for adaptation planners, or explanation of
caveats and limitations. In this context, a careful treatment of high‐end sea level rise, featuring clear criteria
of value for adaptation planners, is needed.
Several recently published papers raised awareness on the possible processes contributing substantially to
sea level rise. These papers have raised much attention in the media where they are often treated as facts,
whereas in reality they are only contributing single arguments or lines of evidence to an ongoing chain of
a scientiﬁc debate, which is far from being resolved. All these studies are scenario independent and are
unspeciﬁc on emissions. Moreover, relevant processes are highly uncertain, featuring limited observational
support. Finally, being part of a scientiﬁc discourse, the papers usually are not intended and should not, on
their own, be used to guide planning and certainly not adaptation investment. As such, they do not alone
represent actionable science for decision makers, though as knowledge and observations evolve, they can
ﬁrst inform lines of evidence or physical limits in Figure 2, and as understanding grows more
probabilistic approaches.
Because of the existing confusion about multiple perspectives on high‐end scenarios (Figure 2 and Table 1),
there needs to be a reconciliation of which approach or combination of approaches is most relevant for what
purpose and which provides the best scientiﬁc support to governments, coastal decision‐makers, and the
public. This requires reconciling the multiple perspectives by integrating the best scientiﬁc information
and guidance to provide a consensus on actionable science that can be used by governments and coastal
decision‐makers depending on their needs. Such considerations and reconciliations need to consider the
time evolution of the system: a 10‐ to 50‐year prediction (that also has to account for natural variability) is
different from a 100‐year projection (Hinkel et al., 2019) and quite different from a multicentury projection
(Figure 3). Within this framework, stakeholder's understanding of high‐end scenarios and their relevance to
different decisions can improve and become more sophisticated, including explicit identiﬁcation of variable
risk tolerance.
As an example, in the UK an H++ scenario range was used to assist in the analysis of the future of ﬂood risk
management for London for the next 100+ years (Lowe et al., 2009; Nicholls et al., 2014). Importantly, H++
was not linked to any probability but rather was considered more pragmatically as a plausible range of policy
relevance by risk averse decision makers in the context of ﬂexible adaptation and the mean sea level compo-
nent extended to about 2‐m rise by 2100. It has been used in sensitivity testing of ﬂood management options
and has given conﬁdence in the Thames Estuary 2100 project plans for London (Ranger et al., 2013). Further,
H++ was applied to nuclear power station design on coasts (Wilby et al., 2011). Importantly, the H++ sce-
nario regional upper bound, and the high‐end probabilistic scenarios extend well beyond the global likely
range reported in the IPCC AR5 report, since, as explained above, the likely range does not specify an
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upper bound. As an example, the most recent thinking on updating H++ in the UK has been informed by
user interaction through a process of codevelopment and acknowledges that a single H++ range based on
current scientiﬁc knowledge might not represent the needs of multiple users. Instead, it may be more
Figure 3. Concepts of sea level rise as a function of time scale. (a) Decadal to multidecadal time scale for which natural
variability is a signiﬁcant factor. (b) One hundred‐year time scale equivalent to the 100‐year projection discussed in
ﬁfth Assessment Report (Church et al., 2013). (c) Two hundred plus year time scale. The building blocks might shift from
red to gray if the time scale of interest gets longer. The distinction between gray and red building blocks is lines of evidence
vs physical implausibility as a function of time scale.
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appropriate for users to follow the approach we described in section 4 of this paper and consider the
conﬁdence in the evidence for different levels of sea level rise in the upper tail of plausible sea level rise,
relating it to their particular level of risk aversion. Users with different levels of risk aversion may choose
alternative H++ upper bounds depending on their particular application, which is typically inﬂuenced by
national standards and national regulators. Thus, the upper bound of sea level rise considered for a user
planning the development of a nuclear power station and a user proposing a farming development near
the coast is almost certain to be quite different.
Katsman et al. (2011) produced a plausible high‐end scenario for the Dutch Delta Commission for their
adaptation program in 2100 and 2200. However, their method was very different to H++ as they summed
the uncertainties in the components quadratically, producing a smaller rise (Le Bars, 2018) but moreover
used current observed rates of dynamical ice mass loss as their starting point, essentially ruling out the
possibility that new emerging dynamical processes like Marine Ice Cliff Instability will dominate the
Antarctic contribution to 2100. The strength was the constraint posed by the observations of ice mass loss.
The Katsman et al. (2011) approach provided a high‐end estimate of about 1 m for 2100 and 3.5 m for
2200, emphasizing the major challenges low‐lying coasts will face beyond 2100 without climate mitiga-
tion. This in itself points to the fact that high end projections cannot be viewed without a speciﬁcation
of the time scale. However, it needs to be recognized by (almost) all users that whatever the considered
time frame, sea level will continue to rise well beyond the end of this time frame (Clark et al., 2016;
Nicholls et al., 2018). This implies we could, instead, present results in such a way that uncertainties
are being speciﬁed in terms of the time a speciﬁc rise in sea level occurs, be it 1, 1.5, or 2 m or any other
user‐relevant threshold. The implication for users of sea level rise information is that we can express
uncertainty as either a range of sea level rise at a given year or we can present a sea level threshold
and represent uncertainty in the year at which that level might be reached. For some users who have
an awareness of a vulnerability at a particular threshold of sea level rise this approach would allow them
to move beyond the issue of whether they will be affected, to one in which they can consider the time
scale over which they need to act. We recall that under present climate change conditions, eventually
sea level will rise many meters if no further mitigation actions come into effect. The only remaining open
question then would be is when?
Rather than extrapolating observations or using highly parameterized physical processes, it might be
more helpful to characterize the tails of the sea level projections either with explicit conditional state-
ments (lines of evidence) together with upper (plausible) physical bounds, thereby acknowledging the
increasing uncertainty with increasing range prohibiting a likelihood statement as discussed above in
the context of Figure 2. Such a consideration needs to be made as a function of time scale considered.
In this context we need to consider that regardless of the time scale considered, the largest source of
uncertainty currently reside in the ice sheet contribution to sea level rise. Our building blocks for the
bands of upper physical bounds are therefore different ice sheet related processes. According to their time
scale, they can migrate from being excluded to being included in the high‐end estimate as lines of evi-
dence multiply/are further developed.
Turning this into a practical recipe for future high‐end sea level estimates, we show in Figure 3, three time
frames, each of which will have considerably different considerations for sea level rise. Figure 3a represents
the near‐term 10‐ to 50‐year time frame over which the impact of different emission scenarios is small (see
also Hu & Bates, 2018), resulting in fairly similar likely ranges from low and high‐end emission scenarios.
On 10‐ to 50‐year time scale the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheet contribution maybe larger than estimated
(gray blocks), but a collapse of the West‐Antarctic ice sheet is not foreseen (red block).
Turning to a 100‐year time frame (Figure 3b), these lines of evidence for higher numbers would involve (with
increasing uncertainty)West Antarctic ice mass loss and an East Antarctic collapse. In the opposite direction
invoking physical plausibility, signiﬁcant East Antarctic ice loss would be the least likely contribution, while
hydrofracturing and instability would be the physically more plausible upper constraint.
Going beyond the centennial time frame to 200 years or more, an RCP2.6 type emission pathway would
likely lead to a reduced rate of sea level rise, while a business as usual RCP8.5 pathway would result in an
increasing rate of rise to above and beyond levels reported for the end of the 21st century and would reach
several meters of height over coming centuries. Lines of evidence for upper bounds would then involve
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hydrofracturing and ice cliff instability and signiﬁcant East Antarctic ice loss. Regarding plausibility limits,
one would need paleo‐evidence, most plausible would be orbit parameters that eventually can lead to
glacial cycles.
In practice, considering all scenarios in a decision process is not always needed or required, implying that
building a high‐end scenario is combining a climate driven probability distribution of sea level rise, con-
ditional on a given high‐end emission scenario (e.g., RCP8.5 or higher), combined with one or more
building blocks. Above all these simpliﬁcations, it still would be desirable to better know the shape of
a sea level pdf given a speciﬁc emission scenario. Very likely, it will be skewed positively toward large
numbers for global averages (regionally this can be the opposite, especially along some coastal regions;
see, e.g., Carson et al., 2015). There is no evidence, however, that the shape of the pdf will remain the
same for all time scales. Instead, it is anticipated that on the decadal time scale, a more symmetric
Gaussian‐type distribution is plausible, given that much of the spread is caused by natural variability.
With increasing time scale, however, more and more feedback processes would come into action, even-
tually possibly leading to signiﬁcant asymmetries with very high upper tails, making use of this informa-
tion for planning purposes increasingly more difﬁcult. Most individual infrastructure decisions are
100 years or less in time scale, with notable exceptions such as nuclear power stations. However, there
are longer‐term implications of individual decisions on, say, the development of a city or protection of
a delta, and resulting lock‐in for adaptation decisions (e.g., Seijger et al., 2018). These are issues that need
to be explored with the relevant stakeholders.
6. Implications and Concluding Remarks
Building a shared framework about robust and scientiﬁcally sound high‐end sea level rise information is
extremely important to better support coastal decision makers and stakeholders. This is especially true for
risk averse stakeholders who need this information to plan long‐term coastal adaptation responses. Such
information also bears important implications for mitigation targets as recognized in the recent IPCC special
report on a 1.5 °C global warming (Hoegh‐Guldberg et al., 2018) quantifying the reduced risk in terms of sea
level rise for a 1.5 °C warming as compared to a 2 °C warming. Clearly, this does not address the high‐end sea
level rise projections, which are associatedmore with RCP8.5 rather than the RCP2.6 scenario type of studies
in SR1.5 (Hoegh‐Guldberg et al., 2018).
To provide a robust consensus about high‐end sea level rise information, a solid and agreed conceptual
framework is essential to provide a scientiﬁcally rigorous presentation of the information, which also
allows the risk aversion of diverse users to be considered. Such a framework cannot be based simply
on expert elicitation or on the latest studies. Instead, it needs to be timeframe and emission scenario‐
speciﬁc, and it also needs to go beyond previous IPCC considerations on the likely range for sea level rise
projections and consider the nature of developing lines of evidence. It can be established by moving
toward information about the upper tail of the underlying sea level rise distribution function, considering
all relevant physical mechanisms including natural climate variability, and also all possible emission sce-
narios. In addition, this framework should distinguish between widely accepted high end projections and
those still considered experimental, and therefore not yet actionable, science. Finally, this framework
needs to consider time scale.
As a step in this direction, we proposed here to use available information about the upper tail of the sea level
rise through the combined use of explicit conditional statements (lines of evidence) with upper (plausible)
physical bounds, thereby acknowledging the increasing uncertainty with increasing time scale. The limited
knowledge implies that a likelihood statement is not possible.
Pursuing such an approach could link previous IPCC‐based information with Coastal Climate Services by
informing users as to how to translate IPCC global and regional information into local user requirements.
To provide such sea level related climate services and to help stakeholders using new emerging sea level
science results to maximum effectiveness calls for greater international cooperation and coproduction
(i.e., integrating science with user needs) to develop sea level change climate services. Such an approach will
help users to apply information about sea level rise in practice, and will better inform the science community
about these needs. The important role of social science research to better frame decision needs is also appar-
ent and this effort must be truly interdisciplinary to succeed.
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